An Examination of the Effects of Auditor Rank on Pre-Negotiation Judgments
AUDITING-A JOURNAL OF PRACTICE & THEORY(2011)
摘要
Auditors often encounter contentious accounting and reporting issues that require resolution with the client. The purpose of the current study is to examine the impact of auditor rank on pre-negotiation judgments. To address these issues, 25 managers and 18 partners examine a rich experimental case in which they are asked to consider their position and that of the client on a difficult inventory write-down situation. The results indicate that partners take a harder stand than managers in calling for a higher initial proposed write-down, minimum write-down, and expected write-down. Also, partners' estimates of the maximum write-down the client is willing to accept are greater than managers' estimates. Finally, partners indicated a smaller difference between their initial write-down and the estimated amount that would be recorded, as well as a larger difference between the estimated amount that would be recorded and the minimum acceptable write-down, than did managers. Contrary to expectations, there were no differences in the level of persuasion knowledge between partners and managers.
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